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Response Essay
History, Ideology, and Erie v. Tompkins
Edward A Purcell, Jr.*

Professor McCim1is's lucid, balanced, and insightful essay is surely correct in suggesting that the long-term significance of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Sosa v.
Alvmez-l'vlaclzain 1 is uncertain. The far-reaching impact of globalization, the changing
position of the United States in world affairs, and the evolution of domestic social and
cultural values may reshape attitudes toward the substantive political issues that underlie
current debates over customary international law. I lis snggcslcd analogy lo Waslzi11glo11
v. Clucksberg2 could prove apt. The Court's history, after all, is replete with doctrines,
analytic frameworks, and interpretive methodologies that have been applied erratically,
remoldcd drastically, discarded silently, or repudiated overtly.

I. Political Dynamics and Constitutional Arguments
As Professor McCinnis has explored Sosa's doctrinal implications so tl10ughtfully, I
consider the case from a different perspective -as a paradigmatic example of the political
dynamic and rhetorical practice of American constilutionalism. The key lo understanding
our governmental system is to recognize the ways in which partisan groups struggle to
sccnrc relatively hospilable institutional havens for themselves among the levels and
branches of government. Such groups support the levels and branches they perceive as
most likely lo favor their policy goals and seek lo check those they perceive as obstacles
or threats. Constitutional doctrines, theories, and principles serve as tools lo magnify the
instilutionul power of the former while minimizing that of the latter. Both this political
dynamic and its generation of contending constitutional arguments arc as old as the
Constitution itself, beginning classically with Hamilton's defense of national authority
(011 the federalism axis) and executive and judicial power (on the separation of powers
axis) and Jefferson's rival defense of state authority (cm the federalism axis) and legislative
power (on the separation of powers axis). Over the years the dynamic has spawned
countless variations and recombinations as rival groups in succeeding generations forged
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their own distinctive constitutional ideologies and rhetorics lo serve their conflicting
purposes in new historical contexts.
That dynamic largely explains the jurisprudential contours of contemporary debates
over customary iutcmutiona] law. 1 '.sscnlially, after World War II some political liberals
became vigorous supporters of the international "IH111wn rights" movement and recognized tlial its principles and institutional achievements could be used lo support their
domestic policy goals, such as prohibiting various forms of discrimination and abolishing
the death penally. They sought lo gain legal leverage by expanding the traditional constitutional dynamic lo include a newly prominent and empowered "level" of authority:
the treaties and customs of inlcrnaliona] law. Quite understandably, political conservatives rose in opposition, severely challenging or flatly rejecting that proclaimed level of
authority. When conservatives succeeded in persuading Congress and the Executive lo
refuse lo ratify most intcmatiouul human rights treaties or lo ratify them with non-selfexecuting declarations and other reservations, liberals began lo look toward the federal
judiciary and maintain that it had the right lo enforce customary iutcmationul law on its
own authority. Conservatives responded by denying that authority and insisting that customary international law could become law in the United States only with the approval
of Congress and the Exccntivc. When the Warren Court used federal judicial power
lo serve liberal policies and conservatives reacted by seeking lo restrict that power and
reverse those policies, their efforts confirmed Ilic two sides in their contrasting views of
the federal judicial power and extended their conflicting altitudes lo issues that ranged
across the spectrum of cousl ilulioua] debate. Tims, by the time that the international
human rigl1ls movement gained new momentum in the late I 970s and the l 980s, the
positions of the two sides had long since hardened into rival ideological principles.
i\gaiml that backgronnd, the opinions in Sosa arc readily uudcrstundablc. Six Justices,
three considered"] ibcrals" and three considered "moderates," joined lo out] inc a cautious
approach lo customary intcrnationul law claims. On the one hand, they affomcd the
power of the federal courts lo enforce customary internutioual law in the context of the
Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 3 but on the other hand they prescribed a highly deferential role
for those courts and limited their power lo claims that met sharply restrictive condiliom.4
Concurring in the judgment denying plaintiffs claim, the Court's three "conservatives"
agreed wi l Ii the I im i ling clcmcn ls of l he ma] orily' s opinion bu l rejected i ls cone I us ion thal
the fedcr~il courts possessed narrow discretion to recognize new customary internatioual
law claims.' Their goal was lo deny the federal judiciary any pmver lo enforce such
claims absent authorization by the lcgisblive and executive branches. Thus, in Sosa the
Justices divided along established ideological lines on a critical issue, while the Court as
an institution inched along a political middle road, edging slightly lo the right.
1

11. The Salience of Erie v, Tonipleins
Just as Ilic lineup of the justices illustrated the political dynamic al work, the treatment
they accorded Erie Ruilrocu] Co. l'. 'f'ompki11i' cxcinplilicd the way the dynamic shapes
conslilutiouul arguments. Erie itself said 11olhi11g about customary intcmational law, and
1
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for a half-century most commentators on the subject assumed that it was not relcvant.7
More recently, however, as humuu rights advocates pressed the federal courts for ever
more energetic enforcement of customary international law, conservatives turned lo Erie
lo bolster their grounds of legal opposiliou.l' Erie, after all, had been the product of
an earlier and quite different ideological era when Progressives sought to restrict the
jurisdiction and lawmaking capacities of the federal judiciary,'! and the Court's opinion
surely contained language that contemporary conservatives could hope lo use.
Tims, the contrary arguments of the Justices took shape. The concurrence contended
that Erie was central to the customary international law issue and that it imposed strict
limitations on federal judicial power. Erie, the concurring Justices argued, held that
there was no such thing as "general" cm1rn1011 law, that federal courts could only make
law when authorized by a positive statutory or constitutional grant, and that mere jurisdictional statutes - such as the ATS - were not grants of lawmaking aulhority.l'' Because
customary international law was part of the "general" c01mn011 law that Erie abolished,
and because customary international law claims were not authorized by the Conslitution or congressional statutes, 11 the concurrence concluded, Erie meant that customary
12
international law necessarily lay beyond the lawmaking power of the federal courts.
In response, the majority rejected that essentially prohibitory interpretation of Erie and
construed the case as establishing for customary international law claims a less restrictive
principle of "judicial caulion."1' While Erie induced a "significant rethinking of the
role of the federal courts" in making common law and eliminated the "general" law, the
majority Justices reasoned, it also inspired a new "special" federal conn non law based on
the constitutional powers of the national government. Tims, for the majority, fi:rie meant
only that the Court should "look for legislative guidance before exercising innovative
. over su 1 rslanhvc. 1 aw. "Ii
uut I iorily
Those contrasting inlcrprcluf ions arc unsurprising,
lndccd, they fit snugly within the
pattern of Erie's forensic history. New Deal liberals construed the case lo uphold broad
congressional power and protect ordinary individuals against harsh corporate litigation
tactics. Warren Court liberals construed it to strengthen the federal courts and free them
from slate procedural mies. Burger and Rehnquist Court conservatives construed it to
prevent the federal courts from creating statutory and coustitutional causes of action
for individuals injured by unlawful behavior, while conveniently ignoring it when they
created federal c011n11on law to protect military contractors from tort suils.15 Tims, the
7 E.g.,
8

')
111
11
12

1'
I-!
I\

RESTATFMENT (T11mn) OF 'rur: l-'01u-:1CN RELATIONS L\\V or rur: LINITED STATES 111, Reporters'
Note 3 (1987).
E.g., Curlis A. lk1cllcy & Jack L. Colrlsmitl}, Customary l nlcruulirnia] /,aw as Federal Co111111011 Law: J\
Critiqueo(thel\Iocleml'ositio11,
110 !!ARV. L. R1-:v. 815 (1997).
EDWARD A. l'URCl•:I.I., )R., BRANDEIS AND TllE l'ROCRFSSIVI\ CONSTITUTION: ERIE, 'nu: )llDICIAL Powi:«,
AND TllE !'Ol.lTICS OF TllE FEDERAL Corners IN TWENTIETll-C~:NTllRY !\~JERICA, ] 3-]6, l 9-2(i, (J4-9]
(2000).
542 U.S. at 744 (Scalia, )., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
The Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. )i 1350 note, is a narrow exception.
The concurrence cilecl Bradley & Coldsmith, supra note 8, and followed their basic argument. Sec 542
U.S. at 739-40, 750 (Scalia, )., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
542LJ.S.at725.
Id. at 726.
I'uRCELL, supra note 9, at 213-16, 287-95, 301-02. The concurrence's position would serve similar
pro-corporate purposes. See William S. Dodge, The Co11slitutio11ality of the J\lie11 Tort Statute: Some
Obsem1tiom 011 Text and Context, 42 VA.). INT'L L. 687, 688 (2002) (noting th:1t the dcfcudants in many
recent ATS suits arc U.S. corporations).
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opinions in Soso followed familiar ideological practice, demonstrating once again that
Erie is a kind of jurisprudential Rorschach lcsl, a device that reveals the political gcds
and values of those who seek lo use it.
The use of Erie in Sosa is particularly problematic for the concurrence, The majority
did not base its conclusions on Erie but merely construed the case as establishing an
important limiting principle. The concurrence, in contrast, relied on Erie as the [ouudaliou of its position. Claiming that /1:rie provided such clear and controlling authority
on customary international law issues seems both puzzling and unjustified.
The claim seems puzzling because lwo of the three Justices who concurred, Justices
Scalia am! Thomas, arc oulspokcu originalists who used Erie to trump the understanding
of the Founders. Erie effected - in the words of the concurrence itself - an "avulsivc
change" l(i that rejected the Founders' views of the nature of the common law. Similarly, Erie also quite likely misconstrued the intention of the First Congress - whose
membership included many of the Founders - when it interpreted the meaning of the
word "laws" in Section 34 of the original Judiciary Act of 1789.17 Such considerations
should have led originalisls to argue that l1:rie, if shielded from overruling by compelling
practical considerations, must be confined lo areas where il already applied and not be
cxtcuclcd to new areas, especially not lo an area such as customary international law
where it repudiates the original uudcrstunding of the Foundcrs.18 Equally striking, the
concurrence defends its embrace of Erie and its "uvulsivc change" Oil the ground that
since 1789 there have been many other changes in both the nature and content of customary international law and federal common law.1'J Tims, its argument assumes that
legal concepts and principles must be altered and adapted lo meet changed historical
conditions, an argument that severely limits, if il docs not fundumcntully undermine,
.
. . 1·ism. 211
t I re c l anus
o f ongllla
The concurrence's claim about Erie is unjustified because the substantial legal changes
that it highlights point to a fuudamcntal flaw in its argument. Like both common law
and customary international law, "general" law was also an evolving concept, not an
eternally fixed category containing timeless and unchanging elements. Between 1789
and 1938, in fact, ils content underwent massive changes. lt expanded broadly as both
constitutional issues and more than two dozen common law fields were pulled within
its realm, leading the Court in 1888 lo confess embarrassment al its inability lo clearly
define ;1ml limit its scopc.21 During the same years, "general" law also contracted as
slate statutes created increasing numbers of "local" laws that narrowed its rule, and most telling for present pmposcs - as the Court withdrew selected components from the

ir, 542 ll.S. at 744-45, 749 (Sc;di;1, j, coucurrnu; i11 part a11d concurriur; i11 the judg111c11t).
l'u1\Ci':LI., rn/ml uolc 9, at )O(i & works cited ;1t 407 1111.98-99.
1
Co11serv;1tives siuularl',: stretched l\rie when they sought to prevent the federal courts from implying private
rights of action under Icdcrul statutes ;111d constitutional provisions even though such actions were within
;1rc;1s that I•:rie expressly rccog11i1.edas proper for federal judicial Lmrnaking. See Eric R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
)(J4 lJ.S. Ci4, 7r> (11J>8).
I'! 542 U.S. at 744-4(i & 11.' (Scalia, J., concurring i11 part and concurriug i11 the judg111ent).
211 The concurrence attempts to reconcile its use of Lrie wilh origiualisrn by, i11 effect, abandoning origiualism.
It contend, th;il ch;111ged historical conditions would have led the Founders to change their views. 542
U.S. at 749-50 (Scalia,)., concurriur; i11 part ;111d concurring in the j11dg111c11t).
21 Bucher v. Cheshire IUt Co., 125 U.S. 555, 58) (1888).
17
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category and incorporated them into authentically "federal" law. Mari lime law was part
of "general" law in lite eigltleenlh century, but by lite early twentieth century the Court
had transformed it into "federal" law through federal admiralty jmisdiclionn The law of
interstate disputes was another area of "general" law based in part ou customary iutcrnational law that lite Court incorporated into "federal" law on lite basis of a jurisdictional
slalule.2' Further, lite Court narrowed lite "general" law of personal jurisdiction ~111d
conflicts of laws by partially ccmslilulionalizing both ficlds.24 Finally, begi11ni11g i11 the
1890s lite Court used the Fourteenth Amendment to coustitutioualizc the "general" law
of limitations 011 government that had developed during the nineteenth cenlmy.2' Thus,
lite conlcut of "general" law changed substantially over time, and lite Court assumed
that il could coustitulioualizc or otherwise incorporate into "federal" law those parts of
"general" law that covered issues foiling within areas of federal constitutioual authority.
Erie abolished the category of "general" law, but it did not define the specific con lent of
that category, and it neither repudiated those prior incorporations nor prohibited similar
incorporations in the future.
Whal Erie did is complex, but for customary international law it is inconclusive. Frie
dclerm iucd ti ia t some elcmcn ls tit en placed wi lit in lite category of "general'' law - exp] ici lly lite commercial law of Swift v. 'J'yson,2(' on its facts the tort law of Baltimore cJ. Ohio
H.ailroacl Co. v. Baugh,27 and by express statement all "general" law fields over which
Congress lacked legislative power28 - were beyond lite non-constitutional lawmaking
authority of lite federal judiciary. J•:rie did not determine that all lite various components
of customary international law were necessarily and forever "general," nor did it determine that Lite Court was powerless lo incorporate some of them inlo "federal" law if lhnl
became approprialc.2'J lndccd, it could not have done so because such a determination
would have contradicted its fundamental conslitulionn] premise that congressional power
is the touchstone of the non-constituliouul lawmaking power of lite federal judiciary. '11
Thus, Erie left nnlouclied the Court's lcmg-cxcrciscd and still-recognized power lo

22 E.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Jc11sc11, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
2' E.g., Kaus.rs v. Colorado, 20(i U.S. 4(i (l 907); I liudcrlidcr
21

2'
2<•
27

2s
2'!
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v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,
)04 u .s. 92 ( l 9)8).
Chapter 7, pp. 2>5-3Ci.
Michael C. Collins, October Tenn, /896- I~mbracing Due Process, 45 i\M. j. Li-:C ..\J. I hsr. 71 (2001 ).
41U.S.1 (1842).
149 lJ .s. 3(i8 ( 189))
Eric R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, '.\04 U.S. C>4, 78 ( 1 'B8).
Illustrating its continuing me of selective incorporation after Erie, the Court decided that conflict of !all's
rules should not lie incorporated into federal common law, KLixo11 Co. v, Slcutor Electric Mauufucturnu;
Co., 313 U.S. 487 ( 1941 ), but that limits OJI personal jurisdiction should remain constitutionalizccl.
luteru.ition.rl Shoe Co. v. \V;1shi11gton, 32(> U.S. 310 (1945). Similnriy, Erie determined that the old "law
merchant," a part of custoiuury international !all' and "gcncr;il" bl\', had been applied beyond the limits
of fcder;il judici;il power, but Cleur/ield Trust Co. v. United Stoles, 318 U.S. 363 ( 194 3), held that one part
of that "law merchant" lay within federal power ;llld rcmai11ecl a11 area of ·'federal" comn10n bw. Again,
the Court had treated the act of st;1te cloctri11e as ;1 matter of"gener;1J" law i11 llll(/erhill v. Uemonde;:, 168
U.S. 250 (1897), but it incorporated th;1t doctrine into federal con1111m1 Lil\' in Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbalino, 37Ci U.S. 398 (1%4).
Erie, 304 U.S. ;1178. The Constitutio11 gr;mts Congress authority to legislate over customary i11tcrnatirnwl
law. U.S. CONST. art I, 8, cl. 10.
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incorporate clements of customary international law whenever those elements involve
issues that foll within areas of federal constitutional authority."

111. Conclusion
Professor fVlcCi1mis is surely right that Sosa, like Erie and so many other constitutional
decisions, leaves many questions unanswered. The Court inevitably deals with complex
;111d for-reaching issues incapable of full and final resolution. Legal materials, moreover,
arc frequently inadequate lo answer the novel and difficult questions that om world
continually generates. We rely unavoidably on the hope of wisdom in the Court.
'1 The old "gcncr;1]" law areas ofadmiralty, interstate controversies, coustitutional limitations on government,

;111d judicial jurisdiction over persons and things all remain recognized areas of federal law, although their
coutcnt has been changed ancl I heir foundations placed on diverse statutory and constitutional provisions.
Further, the Court recognized an ;malogous lvpo of federal law rooted implicitly in constitutional ;111d
statutory sources involving the n.uioual govcrnmc11t's powers over foreign relations that remains in force
today. See United Stales v, Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S )04 (193(i); United Stales v. Belmont,
)01 lJ.S. )24 (1')17).

